A constrained pseudorandom function F : K × X → Y for a family S ⊆ 2 X of subsets of X is a function where for any key k ∈ K and set S ∈ S one can efficiently compute a short constrained key k S which allows to evaluate F (k, ·) on all inputs x ∈ S, while given this key, the outputs on all inputs x / ∈ S look random. Constrained PRFs have been constructed for several families of sets, the most general being the circuit-constrained PRF by Boneh and Waters [Asiacrypt'13]. Their construction allows for constrained keys k C , where C is a boolean circuit that defines the set {x ∈ X | C(x) = 1}. In their construction the input length and the size of the circuits C for which constrained keys can be computed must be fixed a priori during key generation.
Introduction
Constrained PRFs. A pseudorandom function (PRF) [GGM86] is a keyed function F : K × X → Y for which no efficient adversary, given access to an oracle O(·), can distinguish the case where O(·) is F(k, ·) with a random key k ∈ K from the case where O(·) is a uniformly random function X → Y.
Three papers [BW13, BGI14, KPTZ13] independently introduce the concept of a constrained PRF. Consider a set P, where each v ∈ P defines some predicate p v : X → {0, 1} that defines a (potentially exponential-size) subset S v = {x ∈ X | p v (x) = 1}. A constrained PRF for a predicate family P is a PRF F with an additional constrain algorithm k v ← F.Constr(k, v) that on input a key k ∈ K and a predicate v ∈ P outputs a (short) constrained key k v that can be used to compute F(k, x) for all x ∈ S v , while, given this key, all values F(k, x) for x ∈ S v still look random.
Constrained PRFs have been constructed for several interesting predicates. All three papers [BW13, BGI14, KPTZ13] show that the classical GGM construction [GGM86] of a PRF with input domain {0, 1} n gives a prefix-constrained PRF. This means P = {0, 1} ≤n and for any v ∈ P the derived key k v allows to compute F(k, x) for all x with prefix v, i.e., x = v x ∈ {0, 1} n for some x . Assuming (leveled) multilinear maps [GGH13a, CLT13, LSS14] , Boneh and Waters [BW13] construct constrained PRFs for much more general set systems. They present a bit-fixing PRF, where P = {0, 1, ?} n and for v ∈ P we have p v (x) = 1 if x agrees with v on all indices different from '?', i.e., for all i = 1, . . . , n,
. They moreover construct a circuit-constrained PRF, where the predicates are arbitrary circuits C : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} of some fixed depth.
Constrained PRFs (CPRF) have already found many interesting applications. From a prefix CPRF, one can construct a puncturable PRF, which is a constrained PRF for predicates P = {0, 1} n and where for v ∈ P, the key k v allows to compute F(k, x) on all x except v. Puncturable PRFs play a crucial role in the security proof of most of the recent constructions based on indistinguishability obfuscation [BGI + 12, GGH + 13b], and we will also use them in this paper.
The more general bit-fixing and circuit-constrained PRFs can be used to construct a variety of sophisticated cryptographic tools including broadcast encryption (BE) and identity-based noninteractive key-exchange as outlined next.
Broadcast encryption. In a BE scheme [FN94, YFDL04, BGW05, BH08, PPS11, BWZ14] there is a set of n users, and for any given subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of them, we want to be able to encrypt a message (into a short ciphertext) that can be decrypted only by them. This can be achieved using a bit-fixing PRF with domain {0, 1} n : Sample a random key k, and give a constrained key k v i to user i where v i [i] = 1 and v i [j] = ? for any j = i. Thus, k v i allows to evaluate the PRF on exactly those inputs with a '1' in position i.
To broadcast a message m to a set S of users, we simply send a symmetric encryption of m under the key F(k, Non-interactive key exchange. In an identity-based non-interactive key exchange (ID-NIKE) [SOK00, FHPS13, BW13] scheme there are parties that each have some identity id ∈ {0, 1} . Any set S of at most n parties should be able to locally compute a shared key K S , whereas for every party outside of S this key should be indistinguishable from random. Such a scheme can be constructed from a bit-fixing PRF F with domain {0, 1} n· . At setup, sample a key k for F and give to party id ∈ {0, 1} a set of n constrained keys k id is a key for the set ? (i−1) id ? (n−i) . Now, only parties id 1 , . . . , id n can compute the joint key K S = F(k, id 1 id 2 . . . id n ).
CPRFs with unbounded input length. The disadvantage of the BE and ID-NIKE constructions just outlined is that the number n of possible recipients (for BE) or parties agreeing on a key (for ID-NIKE) must be fixed when setting up the system. Moreover, the length of the constrained keys given to every user is at least linear in n.
In this paper we construct a constrained PRF for which there is no a priori bound on the input length. The constraints on keys are given by Turing machines (TM), that is, given a key k and a TM M , we can derive a constrained key k M that allows to compute F(k, x) for any input x where M (x) = 1. The only thing that must be a priori bounded is the size of TMs for constrained keys we want to tolerate. In our construction a constrained key for a TM M will simply be a signature on M together with an obfuscated circuit. This circuit is however universal in that it is identical for all constrained keys and need not be kept secret.
Adaptive vs. selective security. We prove selective security of our constrained PRF, that is, we assume the adversary commits to the input x * for which it wants to distinguish F(k, x * ) from random at the beginning of the security game (that is, before it can query constrained keys for sets S x * ). From a selectively secure CPRF we can get an adaptively secure CPRF (where the adversary can decide on x * after its key queries) via "complexity leveraging"-but this reduction loses a factor that is exponential in the input length. Proving adaptive security for CPRFs without an exponential security loss is generally hard and Fuchsbauer et al. [FKPR14] show that for the bit-fixing CPRF from [BW13] any "simple" security reduction must lose an exponential factor.
Adaptive security of CPRFs was shown for the GGM-based prefix-constrained PRF in [FKPR14] , whose proof only loses a quasi-polynomial (rather than an exponential) factor. Moreover, Hohenberger et al. [HKW14] construct an adaptively secure puncturable PRF with polynomial security loss, but using heavier tools including indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) [GGH + 13b,SW14,PST14]. Hofheinz et al. [HKKW14] construct an adaptively secure bit-fixing PRF, also using iO, and additionally relying on the random-oracle model. We leave the construction of adaptively secure constrained unboundedlength PRFs (for any interesting set of constraints) as a challenging open problem.
Applications. As two applications of our constrained PRFs we show that they directly yield broadcast encryption and ID-NIKE for an unbounded number of parties. In particular, all parameters (private/public key size and for BE also ciphertext overhead) are poly-logarithmic in the number of potential parties (or equivalently, polynomial in the length of the identities). For BE, this has only recently been achieved by Boneh et al. [BWZ14] , who construct a BE scheme supporting n parties directly from O(log(n))-way multilinear maps. For ID-NIKE, our construction is the first to achieve this; all previous schemes require the maximum size of the group of users agreeing on a key to be fixed at setup, and they have parameters that depend at least linearly on this size.
Our construction. An obvious approach to construct a constrained PRF is to start with any standard PRF F. Given a key k and a set S, we can now define a constrained key as a program P S which on input x checks if x ∈ S, and if so, outputs F(k, x). Of course we cannot just use a normal program P S , as an adversary could extract the key k from P S , and therefore F(k, ·) would not be pseudorandom on x ∈ S given P S .
A circuit-constrained PRF. To avoid the above issue, we must obfuscate P S before outputting it. The strongest notion of obfuscation is virtual black-box obfuscation, which requires that an obfuscated program leaks nothing about the program apart from its input/output behavior. Unfortunately, such a strong notion does not exist for general functionalities [BGI + 12]. We therefore use indistinguishability obfuscation (iO), which only guarantees that obfuscations of two circuits (of the same size) which output the same on any input are indistinguishable. A candidate iO scheme has been proposed by Garg et al. [GGH + 13b] . Although the notion seems weak, it has proven to be surprisingly useful.
A powerful tool in the iO literature are puncturable PRFs [SW14] , a type of CPRF for which, given a key k and some input x * ∈ {0, 1} n , one can compute a punctured key k x * that lets one evaluate F(k, x) on all x = x * . Given k x * , the value F(k, x * ) is pseudorandom. The GGM construction [GGM86] of a PRF from a pseudorandom generator is a puncturable PRF (the length of its punctured keys is linear in the PRF input length).
Consider a circuit-constrained PRF derived from a PRF F where a constrained key k S is computed as an iO obfuscation of the circuit P S (which on input x returns F(k, x) if x ∈ S and ⊥ otherwise). If F is a puncturable PRF then we can reduce selectively security of this CPRF to selective security of F as follows. In the selective-security game for CPRFs, an adversary A chooses some input x * , can then ask for constrained keys for any sets S with x * / ∈ S and must distinguish F(k, x * ) from random. We first define a modified game where A, when asking for a constrained key for a set S, gets an iO obfuscation of a circuit P S that outputs F(k x * , x) if x ∈ S and ⊥ otherwise. (The difference of P S and P S is that in the latter F is evaluated using a key k x * that is punctured at x * .)
Recall that the adversary can only submit sets S with x * / ∈ S to its oracle. We thus have P S (x * ) = P S (x * ) = ⊥. Moreover, on any other input x, P S and P S also return the same output (namely F(k, x) if x ∈ S and ⊥ otherwise.) By security of iO, obfuscations of P S and P S are thus indistinguishable, which means that the modified game is indistinguishable from the original game. From an A winning the modified game, we easily obtain an adversary B that breaks the puncturable PRF F: When A commits to x * , B asks for a punctured key k x * , which allows B to answer A's constrained-key queries in the modified game. If A distinguishes F(k, x * ) from random then so does B.
The drawback with this construction is that iO was constructed for circuits only, meaning that the above construction only works for an a priori bounded input length.
A Turing-machine-constrained PRF. To overcome this problem and allow for unbounded input lengths, as a first step we use a collision-resistant hash function H to map long inputs to inputs of fixed length. Concretely, we define our CPRF F as F(k, x) := PF(k, H(x)), where PF is a puncturable PRF. Now how do we define a constrained key for S? Defining a circuit that takes x, checks whether x ∈ S and if so outputs PF(k, H(x)) is not possible, since there is no bound on x, so it cannot be decided by a circuit. We therefore "outsource" the verification of whether x ∈ S and use a succinct noninteractive argument of knowledge (SNARK). A SNARK system is a non-interactive computationally sound proof of knowledge for which proofs are universally succinct. A proof of knowledge π of a witness w for a statement η is succinct if the proof length, as well as its verification time, is bounded by an a priori fixed polynomial in the statement's length |η|.
In particular, we use a SNARK system for the language L := {(H, S, h) | ∃ x : x ∈ S ∧ H(x) = h}. We then define a circuit P S that takes input (h, π) and outputs PF(k, h) if π is a valid SNARK for (H, S, h). This approach solves the problem of checking the legitimacy of an input (that is, x ∈ S) within a circuit. Moreover, our sets S can now be described by Turing machines instead of circuits.
Again, a constrained key k S is an obfuscation of the program P S . In order to give a reduction of security to the puncturable PRF PF, we would, as before, replace the obfuscation of P S by one of P S , which uses k H(x * ) instead of k. Unfortunately, indistinguishability of this replacement is not guaranteed by indistinguishability obfuscation, as P S and P S are not functionally equivalent, which can be seen as follows. There exist values x with x = x * and H(x) = H(x * ) and the adversary is allowed to query a constrained key for a set S containing such an x (provided it does not contain x * ). It could then compute a SNARK π for (H, S, H(x)) ∈ L and run its constrained key on (H(x), π). Whereas P S would output PF(k, H(x)) = PF(k, H(x * )), the modified circuit P S would output ⊥, since its key is punctured at H(x * ). Intuitively an adversary can only distinguish P S from P S if it finds such an x, which together with x * constitutes a collision for H, and should therefore be hard to find. Instead of iO, we resort to a stronger form of obfuscation, called extractability obfuscation (eO, aka differinginput obfuscation) [BGI + 12, BCP14, BST14] . Whereas iO provides indistinguishability of obfuscations of equivalent circuits, eO guarantees that from an adversary that distinguishes obfuscations of two circuits, one can extract an input on which they differ. From a distinguisher of P S and P S we can then extract a collision for H.
Short constrained keys. In the construction just sketched the master key is simply a key for the puncturable PRF PF, and evaluating x only consists of hashing x and evaluating PF on the hash. The expensive operations are issuing constrained keys (which involves obfuscating a circuit) and evaluating the PRF with a constrained key (which runs an obfuscated circuit). Moreover, being obfuscated circuits, the constrained keys are long. We modify our construction to reduce the complexity of the constraining algorithm and the size of keys drastically (whereas evaluation remains expensive).
When setting up the PRF, we construct one single circuit P (described below), which we obfuscate and publish as a public parameter. A constrained key for a set S decided by a Turing machine M is then simply a signature σ on M (that verifies w.r.t. a verification key contained in the public parameters). Given a constrained key (M, σ), the PRF is evaluated on input x as follows:
• define h := H(x) and compute a SNARK π for the statement (H, M, h) proving knowledge of some x such that M (x) = 1 and H(x) = h;
• run the (obfuscated) circuitP from the public parameters on input (M, h, π, σ), whereP (M, h, π, σ) does the following: if σ is a valid signature for M and π is valid on (H, M, h), it outputs PF(k, h), otherwise it outputs ⊥. We use functional signatures in order to prove security of the above construction (this is similar to the construction of functional encryption from eO in [BCP14] ). Assuming a puncturable PRF PF, a collision-resistant hash function H, a SNARK system for the language L legit := {(H, M, h) | ∃ x : M (x) = 1 ∧ H(x) = h}, extractability obfuscation for circuits, and functional signatures, we prove that the above construction is a Turing-machine-constrained PRF for inputs of unbounded length.
Preliminaries

Constrained and Puncturable PRFs
Definition 1 (Constrained Functions). A family of keyed functions F λ = {F : K × X → Y} over a key space K, a domain X , and a range Y, is efficiently computable if there exist a PPT sampler F.Smp, and a deterministic polynomial-time (PT) evaluator, F.Eval such that
On input a security parameter λ, F.Smp outputs a key k ∈ K.
• F.Eval(k, x) = F(k, x): On input a key k ∈ K, and x ∈ X , F.Eval outputs F(k, x).
We say F λ is constrained w.r.t. a family S λ of subsets of X , with constrained key space K S such that K S ∩ K = ∅, if F.Eval accepts inputs from (K ∪ K S ) × X and there exists the following PPT algorithm:
On input a key k ∈ K, and a description 1 of a set S ∈ S λ , F.Constr outputs a constrained key k S ∈ K S such that
Definition 2 (Security of constrained PRFs). A family of (efficiently computable) constrained functions
Puncturable PRFs [SW14] are a particularly simple type of constrained PRFs, whose domain is {0, 1} n for some n, and constrained keys can only be derived for the sets {{0, 1} n \ {x} | x ∈ {0, 1} n }, i.e., a punctured key k x can evaluate the PRF on all inputs except x. Moreover, we only require pseudorandomness to hold against selective adversaries, cf. Appendix B.1 for a formal definition. Puncturable PRFs are easily obtained from (selectively secure) prefix-constrained PRFs, which were constructed from the GGM pseudorandom function [GGM86] for input space {0, 1} n in [BW13,BGI14, KPTZ13].
Collision-Resistant Hash Functions
A family of hash functions is collision-resistant if given a uniformly sampled hash function, it is hard to find two inputs on which the function collides, i.e., returns the same hash value.
Definition 3 (Collision-Resistant Hash Functions). A family of (efficiently computable) functions H λ = {H : {0, 1} → {0, 1} n }, for which H.Smp samples a random function, is a family of hash functions if (·) > n(·), i.e., H is compressing. The family is collision-resistant if for every PPT adversary A:
Indistinguishability and Extractability Obfuscation
As a consequence of their impossibility results for virtual black-box obfuscation, Barak et al. [BGI + 12], proposed two weaker notions: indistinguishability obfuscation (iO), and differing-input obfuscation, also known as extractability obfuscation (eO). Both iO and eO provide means to obfuscate families of circuits. Security of iO guarantees that obfuscations of equivalent circuits are computationally indistinguishable. Extractability obfuscation eO strengthens this security guarantee by requiring that for any efficient adversary that distinguishes obfuscations of two circuits, there exists an efficient extractor that extracts a point on which the circuits differ.
Definition 4 (Indistinguishability Obfuscation [GGH + 13b]).
A uniform PPT algorithm iO is an indistinguishability obfuscator for a family of polynomial-size circuits C λ , if the following hold:
• For all λ ∈ N, C ∈ C λ , and x: Pr C ← iO(1 λ , C) : C(x) = C(x) = 1.
• For every PPT adversary A and all C 0 , C 1 ∈ C λ with C 0 (x) = C 1 (x) for all x:
Definition 5 (Extractability Obfuscation [BCP14] ). A uniform PPT algorithm eO is an extractability obfuscator for a family of polynomial-size circuits C λ and a polynomial-time sampler Sampler, if the following hold:
• For all λ ∈ N, C ∈ C λ , and x:
• For every PPT adversary A and every polynomial q(·), there exists a PPT extractor E A and a polynomial p(·), such that for every λ ∈ N:
A candidate iO for functionalities implementable by NC 1 circuits was constructed based on a simplified variant of multi-linear maps, and proven secure in an idealized model [GGH + 13b]. The same candidate was conjectured to be an eO for NC 1 [BCP14] . In both [GGH + 13b] and [BCP14] , the obfuscators were boosted to functionalities implementable by polynomial-size circuits by using fully-homomorphic encryption [Gen09] .
Let us mention that Garg et al. [GGHW14] presented an implausibility result for eO for arbitrary distributions. Their counterexample uses very contrived auxiliary inputs which contain obfuscated circuits themselves. In contrast, in our construction the auxiliary input is very simple (cf. Proposition 2).
Succinct Non-interactive Arguments of Knowledge
A succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARK) is a non-interactive computationally sound proof of knowledge system for which proofs are universally succinct. A proof of knowledge π of a witness w to a statement η is succinct if the proof's length, as well as its verification time, is bounded by an a priori fixed polynomial in the statement's length |η|.
Definition 6 (The Universal Relation R U [BG08] ). The universal relation R U is the set of instancewitness pairs of the form ((M, m, t), w) where M is a TM accepting an input-witness pair (m, w) within t steps. In particular |w| ≤ t.
We define SNARK systems in the common-reference string model following Bitansky et al. [BCCT13, BCC + 14] as follows.
Definition 7 (SNARK).
A triple of PPT algorithms (Gen, Prove, Verify), where Verify is deterministic, is a succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge (SNARK) for the relation R ⊆ R U , if the following hold:
Pr crs ← Gen(1 λ ); π ← Prove(crs, η, w) : Verify(crs, η, π) = 1 = 1 .
In addition, Prove runs in time poly(λ, |η|, t).
2. (Adaptive) Soundness: For every PPT adversary A:
3. (Adaptive) Proof of Knowledge: For every PPT adversary A there exists a PPT extractor E A such that
4. Succinctness: The length of an honestly generated proof π ← Prove(crs, η, w) and the running time of Verify(crs, η, π) are both bounded by p(λ + |η|) = p(λ + |M | + |m| + log t) where p(·) is an a priori fixed universal polynomial that does not depend on R.
Bitansky et al. [BCC + 14] provide a construction of SNARKs for R c ⊂ R U where t = |m| c and c is a constant, based on knowledge-of-exponent assumptions [BCCT13] and extractable collisionresistant hash functions (ECRHF) [BCC + 14] . These are both non-falsifiable assumptions, but Gentry and Wichs [GW11] prove that SNARKs cannot be built from falsifiable assumptions via black-box reductions. Relying on exponentially hard one-way function and ECRHF, [BCC + 14] provide a SNARK construction for R U .
Functional Signatures
Functional signatures were introduced by Boyle et al. [BGI14] . They generalize the concept of digital signatures by letting the holder of a secret key sk derive keys sk f for functions f . 2 Such a key sk f enables signing of (and only of) messages in the range of f : running Sign(f, sk f , w) produces a signature on f (w). Function privacy requires that signatures under different signing keys be indistinguishable and succinctness requires that the signature length be independent of w and the size of f .
Definition 8 (Functional Signatures [BGI14]).
A functional signature scheme FS for message space M and function family F = {f : D f → R f } with R f ⊆ M ∪ {⊥} consists of the following PPT algorithms:
On input a security parameter λ, Setup outputs a pair of master signing and verification key (msk, mvk).
On input a master secret key msk, and a function f ∈ F, KeyGen outputs a signing key sk f for f .
σ ← Sign(f, sk f , w): On input a function f ∈ F, a signing key sk f for f , and w ∈ D f , Sign outputs a signature σ on f (w) if f (w) = ⊥, and ⊥ otherwise.
Verify(mvk, m, σ) ∈ {0, 1}: On input a master verification key mvk, a message m ∈ M, and a signature σ, Verify outputs b ∈ {0, 1}.
Correctness states that correctly generated signatures verify. Unforgeability is formalized via a game in which an adversary is given the verification key and is allowed queries to a key-generation oracle, key(f, i), and a signing oracle, sign(f, i, m), that work as follows:
• key(f, i): if a signing key for (f, i) has already been generated, return the recorded key; otherwise generate and return a fresh signing key sk f ← FS.KeyGen(msk, f ) and record (f, i), sk f .
• sign(f, i, w): check if there is a record (f, i), sk Function privacy is formalized via a game in which an adversary is given signing keys for two functions f 0 , f 1 (of equal description size) of its choice, then outputs (w 0 , w 1 ) (with |w 0 | = |w 1 |), is given the output of Sign(f b , sk f b , w b ) for some b ∈ {0, 1}, which it has to guess. Finally, succinctness requires that the size of a signature is independent of |w| and |f |, the description size of f . Boyle et al. [BGI14] present a construction based on succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARKs).
Constrained PRFs for Unbounded Inputs
In this section we construct a family of constrained PRFs for unbounded inputs. As a warm-up, we first construct a family of constrained PRFs w.r.t. polynomial-size circuits, whose inputs are of some fixed length.
A Circuit-Constrained PRF
Our circuit-constrained PRF F uses a puncturable PRF PF with input space X = {0, 1} n . The output of F(k, x) is simply PF(k, x). To constrain F w.r.t. a circuit C, we construct a circuit P k,C , which, on input x, runs C on x and outputs PF(k, x) if C(x) = 1, and ⊥ otherwise. A constrained key k C for C is then an indistinguishability obfuscation of P k,C , i.e., k C ← iO(1 λ , P k,C ).
Construction 1 (Circuit-Constrained PRF). Let C λ = {C : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}} be a family of polynomial-size circuits, PF λ = {PF : K × {0, 1} n → Y} a family of puncturable PRFs, and iO an indistinguishability obfuscator for a family of polynomial-size circuits P λ , which contains all circuits defined in (2) for all C ∈ C λ . We construct a family of PRFs F λ = {F : K × {0, 1} n → Y} constrained w.r.t. C λ with a constrained-key space K C such that K C ∩ K = ∅. 3 Following is a description of F = (F.Smp, F.Eval, F.Constr):
On input a secret key k ∈ K and a description of a circuit C ∈ C λ , output
, compute an indistinguishability obfuscation of the circuit P k,C ∈ P λ defined as
F.Eval(κ, x): On input a key κ ∈ K ∪ K C and x ∈ {0, 1} n , do the following:
3 W.l.o.g. we assume from now on that we have K ∩ KC = ∅, as this can always be achieved by simply prepending a '0' to elements from K and a '1' to elements from KC.
• If κ ∈ K, output PF.Eval(κ, x).
• If κ ∈ K C , output κ(x), interpreting κ as a circuit.
The proof of selective security of F, as just constructed, is relatively straightforward. Recall that in the selective-security game, the adversary A outputs x * , then the challenger chooses k ← F.Smp and gives A access to a constrained-key oracle constr, which can be queried on any C with C(x * ) = 0. A must then distinguish F(k, x * ) from random. We modify this game by deriving from k a key k x * which is punctured at x * and computing constrained keys as obfuscations of P k x * ,C (defined like P k,C but using k x * instead of k). Since PF(k, x) = PF(k x * , x) for all x = x * , and since for any circuit C that the adversary can query we have P k,C (x * ) = P k x * ,C (x * ) = ⊥, the circuits P k x * ,C and P k,C are functionally equivalent, and thus by iO the two games are indistinguishable.
An adversary A winning the modified game can then be translated into an adversary B against PF. In the security game for PF (Figure 3, p. 19) , B runs (x * , st) ← A and outputs (x * , {x * }, st). Given k x * and y, B can now simulate the modified game and output whatever A outputs. B's probability of breaking the security of PF is the same as that of A winning the modified game.
A Turing-Machine-Constrained PRF
In this section we construct a family of constrained PRFs for unbounded inputs, whose keys can be constrained for sets decided by Turing machines. We start by observing that in the circuit-constrained PRFs (Construction 1) the size of a constrained key k C for a circuit C depends on the running time of C. This is so, because k C is an indistinguishability obfuscation of the circuit P k,C that runs C to check whether the input is legitimate, i.e., whether C(x) = 1, and if so, evaluates PF. Towards constructing constrained PRFs w.r.t. Turing machines, and avoiding translating running time into key size, we look at a progression of modifications to the circuit-constrained PRFs.
At first attempt, replacing C in P k,C with a TM M , we get a TM P k,M , and therefore we cannot use obfuscation, as current constructions of iO and eO only exist for circuits. Towards making P k,M a circuit, one could outsource the check of input legitimacy outside the circuit to be obfuscated, by using succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARG). However, legitimate inputs are still unbounded, and hence we are back to obfuscating a TM. It is thus necessary to compress the unbounded input to a fixed length in order to obtain a circuit, which in the end we can obfuscate. We achieve this by applying a collision-resistant hash function H to the unbounded inputs, that is, we evaluate the PRF on hashed inputs. In order to guarantee input legitimacy, we use a SNARK to prove that a given hash is the hash value of a legitimate input. We define a circuit P k,M that is given a hash value and a SNARK proof and evaluates the PRF on the hash if the proof verifies. The secret key is then an eO obfuscation of P k,M .
Let us justify the use of eO and SNARKs. As in the case of circuit-constrained PRFs, we want to reduce the selective security of the TM-constrained PRF F to the selective security of the underlying puncturable PRF PF. In a first game hop we replace P k,M with P k h * ,M , which is identical to P k,M except that the key k is replaced with a key k h * that punctures out h * := H(x * ). Unfortunately, the use of the hash function makes the two circuits, P k,M and P k h * ,M , inequivalent: there exists x = x * such that H(x) = H(x * ), and on input H(x), P k,M outputs PF(k, H(x)) = PF(k, h * ) and P k h * ,M outputs ⊥, which means we cannot use iO, and hence we use eO instead.
Hash-function collisions are also the reason we need to use SNARKs rather than SNARGs: if an adversary can distinguish obfuscations of P k,M and P k h * ,M by finding a collision for H then we need to extract this collision in the security proof. Therefore, we use SNARKs (arguments of knowledge).
In this construction, a constrained key k M for a TM M is now an eO obfuscation of a circuit P k,M which is given (h, π) and checks whether π proves knowledge of an x such that H(x) = h and M (x) = 1, and if so, evaluates PF on h. The size of a constrained key k M depends on the size of the description of M , but no longer on its running time.
We further enhance this construction by using functional signatures to reduce both the running time of the key-constraining algorithm and the size of the effective constrained keys (by effective we mean the part of the key that needs to be kept secret). Instead of obfuscating a circuit for each TM M , we obfuscate a single circuit C that works for all TMs. A constrained key for a TM M is now simply a signature σ on M . The circuit C is given σ in addition to (M, h, π), verifies the signature σ on M in addition to verifying π; and if all checks pass, it evaluates PF on h.
The reason for using functional signatures is the following: in the proof of Proposition 2, we will use an adversary against F to build a distinguisher between P k,M and P k h * ,M , who will have to sign TMs to answer the adversary's constraining queries. By eO we know that there exists an extractor E that extracts a differing input. We then need to argue unforgeability of signatures; however, we don't know how E answers the adversary's queries. Thus instead of providing E with a signing oracle, we give it a functional signing key that allows it to produce all necessary signatures.
Definition 9 (R legit ). We define the relation R legit ⊂ R U , where R U is defined in Def. 6, to be the set of instance-witness pairs (((H, M ), h, t), x) such that M (x) = 1 and H(x) = h within t steps, and M is a TM and H is a collision-resistant hash function. We let L legit be the language corresponding to R legit . Furthermore, for notational convenience, we abuse the notation and write ((H, M, h), x) ∈ R legit to mean (((H, M ), h, t), x) ∈ R legit while implicitly setting t = λ log λ .
Remark 1. Observe that t = λ log λ in the definition of R legit implies a super-polynomial upper bound on |x|. Due to succinctness of SNARKs (Def. 7), even an exponential upper bound t = 2 λ would result in SNARK proofs whose length as well as verification time is bounded by p(λ + |M | + |H| + |h|), where p(·) is an a priori fixed polynomial that does not depend on R legit .
Construction 2 (TM-constrained PRF). Let PF λ = {PF : K × {0, 1} n → Y} be a puncturable PRF with fixed input length, H λ = {H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n } λ a family of collision-resistant hash functions, FS a functional signature scheme, eO an extractability obfuscator for a family of polynomial-size circuits P λ , and SNARK a SNARK system for R legit (cf. Def. 9).
We construct a family of PRFs F λ = {F : K × {0, 1} * → Y} constrained w.r.t. to a polynomial-size family of Turing machines M λ . Following is a description of F = (F.Smp, F.Eval, F.Constr). K ← F.Smp(1 λ ): On input a security parameter λ, do the following:
• H ← H.Smp(1 λ ), i.e., sample a collision-resistant hash function.
• crs ← SNARK.Gen(1 λ ), i.e., sample a common reference string for the SNARK.
• (msk, mvk) ← FS.Setup(1 λ ), i,e., sample a pair of master signing and verification key for the functional signature scheme. Let f I : M λ → M λ be the identity function, i.e., f I (M ) = M . Compute a signing key for f I as sk f I ← FS.KeyGen(msk, f I ).
• k ← PF.Smp(1 λ ), i.e., sample a secret key for the puncturable PRF.
• P ← eO(1 λ , P ), i.e, compute an extractability obfuscation for the following circuit P ∈ P λ :
where (H, crs, mvk, k) is hard-coded in P .
• Set pp = (H, crs, mvk, P ) and output K := (k, sk f I , pp).
On input a secret key K, and a TM M ∈ M λ , compute a signature on M as σ ← FS.Sign(I, sk f I , M ), and output k M := (M, σ, pp).
F.Eval(κ, x): On input a key κ ∈ K ∪ K M , and an x ∈ {0, 1} * , do the following:
• Case κ ∈ K, κ = (k, sk f I , pp = (H, crs, mvk, P )): output PF.Eval(k, H(x)).
• Case κ ∈ K M , κ = (M, σ, pp = (H, crs, mvk, P )): if M (x) = 1, set h := H(x) (thus ((H, M, h), x) ∈ R legit ), generate a SNARK proof π ← SNARK.Prove(crs, (H, M, h), x), and output P (M, h, π, σ).
Remark 2. Although pp and P are computed once and for all, and in fact serve as public parameters for the constrained PRF, we include them in the constrained key k M for notational simplicity.
Note that P λ is in fact a family of circuits with an input length upper-bound n = p(λ + |M | + |H| + |h|) + |σ|, where the first summand is due to succinctness of the SNARKs; this still holds even for exponentially long witnesses x (cf. Remark 1). Theorem 1. F λ of Construction 2 is a selectively secure family of constrained PRFs with input space {0, 1} * for which constrained keys can be derived for any set that can be decided by a Turing machine with polynomial description size, if PF λ is a selectively secure family of puncturable PRFs, H λ is a family of collision-resistant hash functions, eO is a secure extractability obfuscator for a polynomialsize family of circuits P λ , SNARK is a SNARK system for R legit from Definition 9, and FS is a secure functional signature scheme.
Proof. Let A be an arbitrary PPT adversary for the game Exp are indistinguishable. Finally we show that Exp 0,(3) and Exp 1,(3) are also indistinguishable, which concludes the proof. All games are defined in Figure 2 , using the following definitions: 1) by replacing the full key of the puncturable PRF PF, with one that is punctured at H(x * ) in the definition of P .
If c ≥ 2 then P := P H,crs,mvk,k as defined Eq. (4) Else P := P H,crs,mvk,k h * as defined Eq. (4) P ← eO(1 λ , P ) 2) is the definition of the circuit P that is obfuscated. In Exp b,(1) the circuit P is defined as in (4), with k ← PF.Smp(1 λ ). In Exp b,(2) , the key k is replaced by k h * ← PF.Constr(k, {0, 1} n \ {H(x * )}), a key that punctures out H(x * ). An adversary that distinguishes Exp b,(1) and Exp b,(2) distinguishes eO obfuscations of P k and P k h * . Thus, there exists an eO extractor that extracts an input on which P k and P k h * differ.
By correctness of PF, the circuits only differ on inputs (M ,ĥ,π,σ), wherê
as that is where the punctured key behaves differently. Moreover, the signature σ must be valid on M , as otherwise both circuits output ⊥. By unforgeability of functional signatures we must havê
as the adversary only obtains signatures via its constrain queries, when it submits machines satisfying (6).
Finally the extracted proofπ must be valid for (H,M ,ĥ), as otherwise both circuits output ⊥. By SNARK extractability, we can therefore extract a witnessx for (H,M ,ĥ) ∈ L legit , that is, (i)M (x) = 1 and (ii) H(x) =ĥ. Now (i) and (6) implyx = x * and (ii) and (5) imply H(x) = H(x * ). Together, this means (x, x * ) is a collision for H. We make this argument formal in the following proposition, which is proved in Appendix C.2. See Appendix C.3 for the proof. We have now reached a game, Exp b,(3) , in which the key k is only used to create a punctured key k h * . The experiment can thus be simulated by an adversary B against selective security of PF, who first asks for a key for the set {0, 1} n \ {H(x * )} and then uses A to distinguish y * = PF.Eval(k, H(x * )) from random. 
Applications
Our first application of constrained PRFs with unbounded input length is broadcast encryption (BE). We construct a scheme where during setup the number of potential receivers need not be known. Users can be dynamically added to the system and are assigned consecutive numbers i ∈ N.
Our scheme is set up by computing a PRF key k, which is used to broadcast and to derive user keys. In order to broadcast a message to the set S ⊆ N, let x ∈ {0, 1} * be the characteristic vector of S (that is x i = 1 iff i ∈ S and all 0's after the last 1 are discarded). Using a symmetric encryption scheme, the message to be broadcast is encrypted under the key K := F(k, x). User i is given a key sk i ← F.Constr(k, S i ) where S i ⊆ {0, 1} * is the set of strings x ∈ {0, 1} * with x i = 1. User i can therefore compute all keys K for sets to which she belongs. Due to space constraints, details are deferred to Appendix A.
ID-Based Non-interactive Key Exchange for Unbounded Groups
In this section we present a construction of identity-based non-interactive key exchange (ID-NIKE) [SOK00] . This allows users to compute shared keys without any interaction-it suffices to know the identity of the users one wants to share a key with. In our construction, a user can compute a shared key for any group of users and there is no a priori bound on the size of these groups. We generalize the construction of [BW13, HKKW14] , where identities are elements from {0, 1} and the system is set up by creating a secret key msk for a constrained PRF. A key for a group of users {id 1 , . . . , id n } is defined as F. Eval(msk, x) , where x = id 1 . . . id n and we assume identities are always ordered lexicographically.
Since in the previous constructions the CPRF is set up for a fixed input length m there is an aprior-fixed maximum number of users which can share a key, namely m/ . As a user's id could appear in any position of the string x, the owner of id is given constrained keys for the sets (id ? (n−1) ) := {id z | z ∈ {0, 1} (n−1)· }, (? id ? (n−2) ), . . . , (? (n−1) id). These keys thus allow the user to compute the key for any set which she is part of.
We generalize this to sets of users of unbounded size. Again, a key for a set {id 1 , . . . , id n } is defined as F.Eval(msk, id 1 . . . id n ), but now n can be arbitrary and is not fixed in advance. In order to let a user with identity id compute the keys of the sets which she is part of-but not anything else-, she is given a constrained key for the following Turing machine M id : on input x ∈ {0, 1} * , machine M id outputs 1 if and only if id is a substring of x, which starts at position i · + 1, for some i ≥ 0, that is, at position 1 or + 1 or 2 + 1, etc.
ID-NIKE. An (unbounded) ID-NIKE scheme consists of three algorithms:
• (pp, msk) ← Setup(1 λ ): On input λ, output public parameters pp and a master secret key msk.
• sk id ← Extract(msk, id): On input msk and id ∈ {0, 1} , output a secret key sk id .
• k I ← KeyGen(pp, sk id , I): On input pp, a key sk id for id and a list I ⊆ {0, 1} of n (for arbitrary n) users with id ∈ I, output a shared key k I .
Correctness is defined as follows: for all id, id ∈ {0, 1} , all I ⊆ {0, 1} with id, id ∈ I, all (pp, msk) ← Setup(1 λ ), sk id ← Extract(msk, id) and sk id ← Extract(msk, id ), it holds that KeyGen(pp, sk id , I) = KeyGen(pp, sk id , I).
Following [PS09] we define security via a game where an adversary can obtain secret keys sk id for identities of his choice and can query secret keys k I for sets I of his choice. The scheme is secure if the adversary cannot distinguish a key k I * for a set I * of his choice from random, where we must have id / ∈ I * for all id for which the adversary queried key extraction, and I * = I for all I for which the adversary queried a shared key. We prove that our scheme satisfies the selective variant of this definition, where the adversary must output I * before getting access to its oracles.
ID-NIKE from constrained PRFs for unbounded inputs. Our unbounded ID-NIKE is obtained from a constrained PRF with unbounded input length (F.Smp, F.Constr, F.Eval) as follows.
• Setup(1 λ ): Return msk ← F.Smp(1 λ ).
• Extract(msk, id): On input id ∈ {0, 1} do the following: define a Turing machine M id that on input a string x ∈ {0, 1} * outputs 1 iff x is of the form x id x with x ∈ {0, 1} n · and x ∈ {0, 1} n · for some n , n ∈ N; return sk id ← F.Constr(msk, M id ).
• KeyGen(pp, sk id , I): If I = {id 1 , . . . , id n } ⊆ {0, 1} for some n and id ∈ I then define x := id i 1 . . . id in , with id i j < id i j +1 for all j, and output k I := F.Eval(sk id , x); else output ⊥.
Correctness of our scheme follows from correctness of the underlying constrained PRF. Selective security of the ID-NIKE follows from selective security of the CPRF (Definition 2). Given an adversary A against the ID-NIKE, we construct an adversary B against the CPRF. First B runs A to obtain I * and sends x * , the concatenation of the lexicographically ordered elements of I * , to its challenger. B answers A's queries as follows: When A queries a secret key for id ∈ I * or the shared key for I * then reply with ⊥. On a legal secret-key query for id, construct a Turing machine M id as in the definition of Extract, query the constr oracle on M id and forward the reply to A. When A queries a shared key for a set I = I * , construct x as in KeyGen, query eval on x and forward the reply.
Note that B makes no illegal queries (any queried M evaluates x * to 0 and x * is never queried to eval) and perfectly simulates the game for A. When B receives a value y which is either F.Eval(msk, x * ) or random, it forwards y as the challenge key k I * to A and outputs whatever A does. B thus breaks the CPRF with the same probability as A breaking the ID-NIKE, which concludes the proof.
• sk i ← KeyGen(msk, i): On input a master key msk and a member identity i, output sk i , a secret key for member i.
• (hdr, K) ← Encrypt(bk, S): On input a set S ⊆ N and a broadcast key bk, output a header hdr and a key K ∈ K sym . (A message m is then actually broadcast as (S, hdr, enc(K, m)).)
• K ← Decrypt(i, sk i , S, hdr): On input a member identity i and an associated secret key sk i , a set S ⊆ N and a header hdr, if i ∈ S then output a symmetric key K ∈ K sym . (Given a broadcast (S, hdr, C), one can then compute m ← dec(K, C).)
Like Boneh and Waters [BW13] , whose construction we build on, we will construct a secretkey BE scheme, where bk must only be known to the broadcaster. Correctness of a BE scheme is defined as follows: for all S ⊆ N, i ∈ S, all (bk, msk) ← Setup(1 λ ), sk i ← KeyGen(msk, i) and (hdr, K) ← Encrypt(bk, S), we have K ← Decrypt(i, sk i , S, hdr).
Selective security is defined via the following game Exp BE-b for an adversary A:
Oracle key(i) :
Oracle encrypt(S) :
We say BE is secure if Adv
BE from constrained PRFs for unbounded inputs. For a finite set S ⊆ N, we define the characteristic vector χ S as the vector whose length equals the largest element in S and whose entry at position i is 1 iff i ∈ S. Let (enc, dec) be a symmetric encryption scheme with key space K sym . Let F = {F : K × X → Y} be a constrained PRF with input space X = {0, 1} * and range Y = K sym for which constrained keys k i for the following set can be computed:
(As S i can be decided by a polynomial-time Turing machine, our construction from Sect. 3.2 can be used.) Then we define a broadcast encryption scheme BE with optimal ciphertext length (that is, the header is empty: hdr = ∅) as follows:
• Setup(1 λ ): Generate k ← F.Smp(1 λ ) and return bk := k, msk := k.
• KeyGen(msk, i): Return k i ← F.Constr(msk, S i ) with S i as in (7).
• Encrypt(bk, S): Let χ S ∈ {0, 1} * be the characteristic vector of S, compute K ← F.Eval(bk, χ S ) and output (∅, K).
• Decrypt(i, sk i , S, hdr): With χ S as above, output K ← F.Eval(sk i , χ S ).
Correctness of BE follows from correctness of F; security follows by reduction to selective pseudorandomness of F. Let A be a PPT adversary that breaks security of BE; we construct a PPT algorithm B = (B 1 , B 2 ) that breaks F with the same probability:
The selective-security game for puncturable PRFs.
-Let x * be the characteristic string of S * .
-Return (x * , st A ).
-simulate key(i): define S i as in (7);query k i ← constr(S i ); reply k i ; -simulate encrypt(S): define the characteristic vector χ S ∈ {0, 1} * of S; query K ← eval(χ S ); reply (∅, K).
By construction, we have Exp 
B.2 Security of Functional Signatures
A functional signature scheme, as defined in Def. 8 is secure if it has the following properties, where we formalize unforgeability following [BF14] , who introduce a similar primitive. 
-crs ← SNARK.Gen(1 λ ).
-k ← PF.Smp(1 λ ).
-P ← eO(1 λ , P H,crs,mvk,k ) with P H,crs,mvk,k defined in (4).
-Let f I and f x * as defined in (3).
-Set pp := (H, crs, mvk, P ), st := (x * , st A , pp, k, f I , f x * ).
-Return (f 0 := f I , st), where f I is padded to be of length |f x * |.
if M / ∈ M λ ∨ M (x * ) = 1, reply ⊥; else do the following:
4 (st, σ c ) // σ c is either a signature under sk f I or under sk f x * -Finish the constr query reply for A 2 with (M, σ c , pp).
-Simulate eval queries like D
3 . -Simulate further constr queries:
If σ c was generated using the signing key sk f I then D (i) simulates Exp b,(0,i−1) and if sk f x * was used then D (i) simulates Exp b,(0,i) . The only difference between D (i) 's simulation and the actual game is that D (i) pads the function f I to match the length of f x * . This is however oblivious to A, since all A gets to see are signatures computed using f I , which, by succinctness of FS, are independent of |f I |. We therefore have Pr[Exp
We assumed that
There must thus exist an i ∈ {1, . . . q} such that for infinitely many λ's:
This contradicts function privacy of the functional-signature scheme, and we conclude that
C.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Assume towards contradiction that there exists a PPT adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) that distinguishes Exp b,(1) and Exp b,(2) with non-negligible probability, i.e., there exists a polynomial q(·) such that for infinitely many λ, Pr 
Then we construct B, that distinguishes eO-obfuscations with auxiliary input distributed according to a PPT sampler (P k , P k x * , aux) ← Sampler(1 λ ), defined as follows:
-(x * , st A ) ← A 1 (1 λ ).
-H ← H.Smp(1 λ ), and set h * = H(x * ).
-(msk, mvk) ← FS.Setup(1 λ ).
-sk f x * ← FS.KeyGen(msk, f x * ), with f x * as defined in (3).
-k h * ← PF.Constr(k, {0, 1} n \ {h * }).
-Construct P 0 := P H,crs,mvk,k and P 1 := P H,crs,mvk,k h * as defined in (4).
-Set aux = (mvk, x * , st A , H, crs, sk f x * , k).
-Return (P 0 , P 1 , aux).
We then define an algorithm B, which is run on the output of Sampler, that can distinguish obfuscations of P 0 and P 1 . -(x * , st A ) ← A 1 (1 λ ).
-Query key(·, ·) on (f x * , 1) to obtain sk f x * for f x * as defined in (3).
-(M ,ĥ,π,σ) ← E B 1 λ , P 0 , P 1 , aux .
-Output (M ,σ).
By condition(1), (M ,σ) satisfies FS.Verify(mvk,M ,σ) = 1. Furthermore, A forg asked for a single signing key sk f x * , and no signing queries. So, ifM (x * ) = 1, then by definition of f x * ,M / ∈ R f x * , i.e., not in the range of f x * , and hence Exp Since the SNARKπ extracted by E B is a proof of knowledge, we can extract a witnessx for it. In order to formally apply item 3. of Def. 7, we first construct a machine A snrk that outputsπ together with the statement. A snrk simply runs Sampler and E B as defined above, except that it uses crs from its input.
A snrk (crs)
-sk f x * ← FS.KeyGen(msk, f x * ) with f x * defined in (3).
-Output (η := (H,M ,ĥ),π).
By the construction of A snrk , Eq. (10) and condition(1) we have that .
Then we construct a PPT adversary B = (B 1 , B 2 ) playing Exp
PCT-b
PF,B (λ), the selective-security game of PF (cf. Fig. 3, p. 19 ) as follows. (Note that B 2 does not use its eval(·) oracle.)
-Return (h * , T := {h * }, st := (H, x * , st A )).
(st, k h * , y * ) // y * is either PF.Eval(k, H(x * )) or random -crs ← SNARK.Gen(1 λ ).
-P ← eO(1 λ , P H,crs,mvk,k h * ) with P H,crs,mvk,k h * defined in (4).
-Set pp := (H, crs, mvk, P ). 
